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authorTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>2017-10-21 23:47:52 +0200
committerMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>2017-11-25 11:52:34 +0100
commit4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8 (patch)
tree2797e870aa9b0d2fb29efc921fdcfa8c6086fcdd
parent75b10c972d15c036a692ef4590a81a6c54d384f6 (diff)
Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files. (CVE-2017-16612)
It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments. The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes 4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads. The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate less memory than needed for subsequent reads. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
-rw-r--r--src/file.c12
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c
index 43163c2..da16277 100644
--- a/src/file.c
+++ b/src/file.c
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
+ if (width < 0 || height < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
+ return NULL;
+
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
@@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length)
{
XcursorComment *comment;
- if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
+ if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
return NULL;
comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1);
@@ -448,7 +453,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
- if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
+ if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE ||
+ head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
@@ -457,6 +463,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
/* Create the image and initialize it */
image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height);
+ if (image == NULL)
+ return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;